A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme Henk Norde* Hans ReijnierseÂ bstract A balanced set of weights infers an inequality th a t games w ith a nonem pty core obey. T his paper gives a generalization of th e notion 'balanced set of w eights'. H erew ith it provides necessary and sufficient conditions to determ ine w hether a TU -gam e has a population monotonic allocation scheme or not. F urtherm ore it shows th a t every 4-person integer valued game w ith a popula tion m onotonic allocation scheme has an integer valued population monotonic allocation scheme and it gives an exam ple of a 7-person integer valued game th a t has only non-integer valued population monotonic allocation schemes.
I n tro d u c tio n
In Sprumont (1990) the concept of a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas for short) has been defined as a kind of extension of a core allocation (cf. Moulin (1989)). A pmas gives a core allocation for every subgame of a TU-game such that every player gets a weakly higher payoff in larger coalitions. Games with a pmas have obviously a nonempty core. Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967) independently proved that a game (N ,v) has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced, that is, for each balanced set of weights {A s} s c n , the game obeys the corresponding inequality: ANv (N ) > ASv (S ). S£N Here, a balanced set of weights consists of nonnegative numbers with the property that An eN = S(^N ASeS, in which eS denotes the indicator vector of S . The following interpretation can be given to this inequality: if every member of S works AS hours in coalition S , which generates a profit of v(S ) dollars per hour, and if every player in N works the same number of hours (AN ) in total then it is more profitable for the whole society to work together all of the time in the grand coalition. The class of balanced games is a finitely generated cone in the space of TU-games. The class of games with a pmas is a subcone of it, also finitely generated. Hence, there exists a collection of inequalities that describes this subcone. This collection is larger than the *D ept. of E conom etrics, T ilb u rg U niversity, P.O .B ox 90153, 5000 LE T ilb u rg , T h e N eth erlan d s tD e p t. of M ath em atics, U niversity of N ijm egen, T oernooiveld, 6525 ED N ijm egen, T h e N e th er lands collection of inequalities describing the cone of balanced games and will be described in this paper by introducing the notion 'generalized balanced set of weights'. This description enables us to answer an open question postulated in Reijnierse (1995): "Do there exist integer valued games with only non-integer valued pmasses?" . In Section 6 we will show that the answer is negative for 4-person games. Section 7 however, gives an example of such a game with 7 players.
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P re lim in a rie s
Let N be a finite set and let GN be the space of TU-games with player set N . Let M = {S C N | S = </>}.
D e fin itio n 1:
A population monotonic allocation scheme or pmas of the game (N , v) is a table x = { x S i} SGM iGS with the properties:
x S, i < xT, i for all S ,T G M, i G S C T.
The class of games with player set N that have a pmas is called P M N, or P M if no confusion can occur. Sprumont (1990) was the first who proved the following result:
T h e o r e m 2: The class P M N is a cone and it is generated by the collection of all simple monotonic i-veto games in GN, united with the games -u i (i G N ). 
This collection will be called g(PM )
.
be a gbw with associated numbers { i i ST | i G T G A ,T C S G A }. Suppose that ^^a SSv (S ) = Tg _a ATv (T ). Then XS,i = XT,i for every triple (i, S, T ) with i G T C S and i i ST > 0.
The following interpretation can be given to an inequality corresponding to a gbw: if the society N works according to schedule {AT}tga and if a rescheduling {Ss } Sga is possible such that all members in the society work the same hours as before but in larger coalitions (not necessarily the grand coalition) then such a rescheduling is profitable for the whole society.
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V erifying w h e th e r a tu p le is a gbw Let ({Ss } Sga , {At }tga) be a tuple with properties (i) and ( 
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T h e co n v erse s ta te m e n t 
Si Hence, to prove the Theorem, it is sufficient to prove that v G PM**, i.e. that (w,v) > 0 for every w G PM *. In order to show this last statem ent, it suffices to prove that every w G PM * induces an inequality that corresponds to some gbw. \1 ) and a T2 D S with v(T2) = v(T2\2 ) which contradicts  condition v(Ti ) + v(T2) > v(12) + v(T i \1 ) + v(T2\2 ), which is one of the conditions  in (D )-(F) and (H)). Assume v (T ) > v(T \1 ) for every T D S . If v(134) = v(34) 
If there exists a coalition S G A i such that node(S) G P and u t (S) = 1, then there exists a T G T such that the capacity of arc(S, T ) contributes to the capacity of (P, V \ P ). The capacity of this arc alone exceeds d already. Hence, we can assume that such a coalition does not exist, i.e. all elements of A i\S have coalitional value 0 with respect to ut and the capacity of each arc with beginpoint in A i and end-point in Ai does not contribute to c (P ,V \P

F o u r p e rso n gam es
Consider for a (characteristic function of a) 4-person game v the following inequalities, which correspond to gbw 's: (A) v(ij) > v(i) + v(j) (6 inequalities (B) v(ijk) > v ( i) + v ( jk ) (12 inequalities ( c ) v(1234) > v(i) + v(jkl) (4 inequalities (D) v(ijk) + v(jkl) > v(ij) + v(jk) + v(kl) (12 inequalities (E) 2v(ijk) > v(ij) + v(ik) + v(jk) (4 inequalities (F) v(ijk) + v(1234) > v(ij) + v(jk) + v(ikl) (G) v(1234) > v ( ij)+ v (k l) (H) 2v(1234) > v(ij) + v(jkl) + v(ikl) (i) 3v(1234) > v(123) + v(124) + v(134) + v(234) (12 inequalities) (3 inequalities) (6 inequalities) (1 inequality) Different characters are used to denote different players. If a 4-person game has a pmas then this game satisfies all conditions (A)-(I). In this section we prove that these conditions are sufficient conditions in order to guarantee that a game has a pmas. As a byproduct we get that an integer-valued 4-person game with a pmas has an integer valued pmas. Note that the conditions (A), (B), (C) and (G) im ply superadditivity, the conditions (C), (G), (H) and (I) im ply balancedness and the conditions (A), (B), (C), (E), (G), (H) and
W ithout loss of generality assume that S = (12). Either v(T ) > v (T \1 ) for every T D S or v(T ) > v (T \2 ) for every T D S (otherwise there is a Ti D S with v(T i ) = v(Ti
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A n in te g e r gam e w ith only n o n -in te g e r pm asses 
